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LOUIS D. BRANDEIS. By Philippa Strum.1 Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1984. Pp. xv, 508. $27.50. 
BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER. By Leonard Baker.2 
New York: Harper and Row. 1984. Pp. 567. $25.00. 
Michael P. Zuckert3 
Until very recently readers have not required a comprehen-
sive, comparative evaluation of Brandeis biographies. Alpheus T. 
Mason's Brandeis: A Free Man's Life monopolized the field. Ma-
son's book has set a standard, not merely for Brandeis studies, but 
for all judicial biographies. Almost forty years after its initial 
publication, it is still easy to see why that should be so. As the 
"authorized" biographer, Mason had certain advantages that he 
used to very good effect. In addition to Brandeis's mass of papers, 
he had access to Justice Brandeis himself and derived insights at 
first hand that others have had to reconstruct at second and third 
hand at best. Mason's was clearly a labor of love as well; his ad-
miration for Brandeis shines through on almost every page. Ma-
son loved his work and crafted it accordingly-his book is 
thorough, careful, judicious, thoughtful, and informative. Within 
the past few years, however, not only the two books under review 
here, but at least four other major biographical studies of Brandeis 
have appeared on the market.4 
Mason proved that a craftsman's work can hold its own for a 
very long while even in the fins and chrome, novelty-oriented aca-
demic market. Yet the appearance of so many new books in such 
a short period cannot be attributed solely to the thirst for novelty. 
The new books have appeared, one supposes, in response to two 
developments. First, the passage of time has made available 
much new primary source material to which Mason did not have 
access. Some of the materials relate directly to Brandeis himself-
for example the Urofsky and Levy edition of his letters, and the 
I. Professor of Political Science, City University of New York. 
2. Journalist and professional writer; winner of 1979 Pulitzer Prize for Biography. 
3. Dorothy and Edward Congdon Professor of Political Science, Carleton College. 
4. A. GAL, BRANDEIS OF BOSTON (1980); B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANK-
FURTER CONNECTION (1982); L. PAPER, BRANDEIS (1983); M. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRAN-
DEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION (1981). 
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Brandeis-Frankfurter papers around which Bruce Murphy built 
his challenging study of the two justices' extrajudicial activities. 
Moreover, while Mason had the advantage of immediate access to 
Brandeis, he necessarily missed out on the papers, oral histories, 
and materials of other men that have become available in the past 
thirty years. 
The passage of time has also led historians to view Brandeis's 
times differently from the way they once did. From the perspec-
tive of the 1970's and 1980's both the Progressive era and the New 
Deal have changed their visage, and since Brandeis's career was 
so intimately bound up with those times, it must be reassessed in 
the light of changed perceptions. At the same time, distance from 
Brandeis also encourages the retelling of his life; Mason's version, 
it must be admitted, suffers from some of the flaws of "authorized 
biographies" written by admiring younger men. It is not that Ma-
son is uncritical, but the blemishes he finds are so inconsequential 
compared to the strengths of the man that our cynical age can 
hardly help wondering whether he has done justice to the justice. 
It is a tribute to Brandeis, or to his biographers, that for the most 
part he retains his appearance as a giant in these new retellings of 
his life. (I say "for the most part" only, because Bruce Murphy 
does raise very serious ethical questions about Brandeis.) 
A further development in the nearly forty years since Ma-
son's book that might have been expected to have an impact on 
the new generation of Brandeis studies has not done so. The very 
interesting approaches we might class under the heading of 
"psychohistory" or "psychobiography" have no more place in 
these new studies than they did in Mason's. Perhaps judicial biog-
raphy-or is it judicial biographers?-is especially resistant to 
psychoanalytic approaches. Witness the controversy over the re-
cent psychological study of Justice Frankfurter by H. N. Hirsch.5 
In any case, the newer model Brandeis books are not much 
different in form or function from the older Mason model they 
would supplant. In the classic tradition of biographies, most of 
them are "inclusive, archival and comprehensive in detail."6 The 
continuity with Mason's book can be seen easily enough by glanc-
ing at the tables of contents of the newer books-in most of them 
the organization of the materials is remarkably similar to Mason's. 
Emphases differ-more concern with Brandeis's Zionism in 
Strum, with his relationship to Frankfurter in Baker, with his 
5. H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981). 
6. Nadel, George Eliot and Her Biographers, in HAIGHT & VAN ARSDEL, GEORGE 
ELIOT-A CENTENARY TRIBUTE 115 (1982). 
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Court career in Paper-but the basic outline of each book is the 
same as Mason's. In a sense, of course, this is merely to say that 
all are biographies, and as the story of the same life they might be 
expected to have the same outline. Agreed; and yet the very con-
servatism in form bespeaks a lack of the daring necessary to 
change the ways in which we perceive the subject. 
Because of the narrative character of these biographies, their 
qualities will best be revealed by a comparative look at their treat-
ments of some specific events in Brandeis's career. From the spe-
cific we can move naturally to a more general assessment. 
I 
As Melvin Urofsky says, "The one case more than any other 
associated with Louis Brandeis's name" is Muller v. Oregon, a case 
testing the constitutionality of an Oregon law limiting the number 
of hours women may work in a day. The biographers for the most 
part tell the same story---<>f the legacy of Lochner and the liberty 
of contract doctrine; of Brandeis's sister-in-law Josephine Gold-
mark and her comrade at the National Consumer's League, Flo-
rence Kelley; of their effort to retain Joseph H. Choate to argue 
the case for them; of that conservative gentleman's refusal to take 
the case on the ground that a husky Irish washerwoman should be 
allowed to work more than ten hours per day, if she wished. Fi-
nally, they all describe the brief itself-Brandeis's derring-do in 
presenting a mere two pages of traditional legal argument and a 
hundred or so pages of scientific and social scientific evidence 
about the effects of long hours of work on women. And, of course, 
they emphasize Brandeis's triumph, not only securing a unani-
mous victory in a case many expected to go the other way, but, 
more than that, receiving a commendation by name in the Court's 
opinion. 
The more recent biographies do contain some information 
about the case apparently unknown to Mason, but little of the new 
information is of much overall importance. Relatively more im-
portant differences of interpretation and presentation, however, 
distinguish the different biographies from each other. Strum's is 
by far the most satisfactory. Like the others, she treats Brandeis's 
procedure in Muller as marking a great innovation, but she more 
clearly, more accurately, and more profoundly sees how Muller 
fits into the context of Supreme Court jurisprudence at the time, 
and thus avoids the great simplifications, overstatements, and 
even contradictions of the other accounts. She, alone of the au-
thors here, chases the liberty of contract doctrine back to the 1894 
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case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana, where a unanimous Court invoked 
that liberty as part of the fourteenth amendment's due process 
clause, but where the Court also held, as Strum puts it, that this 
liberty, "was subject to the regulatory powers of the state. Proper 
exercise of these powers was a matter to be decided by the courts 
on a case-by-case basis." Alone of all the biographers, she fol-
lowed that doctrine into Holden v. Hardy, decided the very next 
year, in which the Court upheld a law limiting the number of 
hours miners may work as a health and safety regulation. She 
notices that even in the notorious Lochner case, the Court was pre-
pared to sustain the law if satisfied that it was a genuine health 
measure. The result in Lochner might have been different, Strum 
suggests, if the attorney general of New York had made more than 
his "mild attempt" to show that the regulation was a health law. 
Thus, while she gives due recognition to the novelty of what Bran-
deis did in Muller, she places his strategy clearly within the con-
text of the liberty of contract doctrine as the Court was actually 
applying it-on a "case-by-case-basis," examining whether the 
regulation being challenged could be justified on grounds of 
health, safety, or morals. She shows that Brandeis's novel form of 
argument was responsive to the way the Court framed the issue in 
liberty of contract cases. She thus helps the reader understand 
that one reason for Brandeis's victory was the fact that his novel 
method fundamentally followed rather than challenged the 
Court's jurisprudence. 
Strum thus does not impose on the reader such misstatements 
as Baker's claim that Brandeis was asking the "Court to change its 
thinking, jettison its definitions." Indeed, Baker's treatment of the 
Muller case is characterized by inaccuracy and oversimplification 
in any number of places. He asserts that Brandeis aimed to estab-
lish Muller as a precedent for the proposition that "there is no 
limit beyond which the legislative power may not go." Apart 
from the fact that, as Strum shows, Muller was highly unsuited to 
establishing such a proposition, there is much reason to believe 
that Brandeis himself would have rejected it as Strum shows in 
her analysis of Brandeis's broader position. Moreover, Baker's 
more uncontrolled pronouncements run afoul of observations he 
himself makes about Brandeis's argument, as when he acknowl-
edges that the main thrust of the argument was to "demonstrate 
reasonableness," and that he "acknowledged that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protected the right to sell or purchase labor." Hav-
ing failed to set the case clearly and firmly into its constitutional 
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context,7 Baker does not see that these comments undercut his ear-
lier claims. 
Instead of delineating the constitutional context of Muller, 
Baker gives us a Masterpiece Theater type of costume drama set-
ting, in which the reader is treated to all manner of irrelevant but 
"picturesque" detail. For example: "The nine justices sat on a 
raised platform, behind them were an arched doorway, a gilded 
American eagle, and marble columns." Likewise, he gives us two 
sentence "profiles" of all the sitting justices, which serve little pur-
pose other than to supply opportunities for several gratuitously 
snide asides about the ones he dislikes. 
Baker treats Muller as a morality play of good-guy, bad-guy 
politics, economics, and constitutional law, in which intelligent, 
caring people confront hard-hearted, greedy, legally backward ex-
ploiters, or dupes of exploiters. Revealingly, he titles this section 
of his book "Knight Errant." He tells us, for example, that 
"Choate's lifestyle demanded that he oppose legislation such as 
the Oregon ten-hour law." Then, as if he were writing a television 
script, he surveys Choate's mansion, his trimmed lawns and clean 
table linens, his servants, heating "water for tea, coffee, or hot 
chocolate." Now since we know that many wealthy people have 
supported legislation like Oregon's, and since we do not know that 
Choate's wealth would be in the slightest threatened by women in 
Oregon working only ten hours a day, or women everywhere 
working ten hours a day, and since Baker furnishes no evidence to 
impugn Choate's sincerity, all this is immaterial and unfair.s 
Even Mason, whose knowledge of constitutional law is ordi-
narily impressive, does not do justice to Muller's constitutional 
context, and hence fails to describe the true character and signifi-
cance of the case. Surely nothing in the Court's decision, nor in 
Brandeis's argument, justifies Mason's conclusion that in Muller 
"the Court had rejected its own freedom-of-contract fiction as re-
gards working women." The Court had not so much rejected its 
doctrine as it had been brought by Brandeis to see how that doc-
trine applied in the factual situation before it. One might think of 
the analogy of the separate-but-equal doctrine, under which from 
7. Baker's inaccuracies extend to small as well as large matters, and recur through-
out the book. He says, for example, that Florence Kelley's father was "an Illinois Con-
gressman." In fact, he was the well-known Pennsylvania congressman, "Pig-iron" Kelley. 
More important, he incorrectly identifies Baker v. Carr as demanding "that legislative and 
congressional districts be equal in population size." 
8. Melvin Urofsky sins less mightily than Baker, but his treatment of Muller is rather 
similar. Not setting the case properly into the context of the constitutional law of the time, 
he makes overstatements such as, "The ten-hour law struck at the heart of the conservative 
creed, the idea of liberty of contract." M. UROFSKY, supra note 4, at 51-52. 
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time to time the Court found that particular separate institutions 
were unequal and therefore unconstitutional. Such decisions did 
not overturn the separate-but-equal doctrine; rather, they applied 
it. 
There is a point in all this that bears on the broader question 
of the value of judicial biography as a genre. The superficial facts 
about the Brandeis brief are well-known, well agreed on, and fre-
quently retold in these and other books as well. But what makes 
the various treatments differ from each other is the context into 
which those facts are set and the significance of the case within 
that context. Why did only Strum bring to bear a context that 
would make the meaning and character of Muller relatively clear? 
No doubt the very nature of biography tends to lead authors to 
slight historical context, as they describe the doings of their sub-
ject, neglecting events in which he did not participate or to which 
he does not explicitly point them. Brandeis played no part, after 
all, in Allgeyer or Holden. 
One could push the inquiry further by wondering about some 
issues that even Strum does not raise. None of our authors asks 
broader questions about the meaning of the doctrine of liberty of 
contract. For example, none of them makes the least effort to 
enter sympathetically into a consideration of what might have rec-
ommended such a doctrine to the Supreme Court (other than 
Choate's alleged concern to have a ready supply of servants to 
make his hot chocolate). None considers the connection between 
the attack on slavery and the increasing emphasis on ideas such as 
liberty of contract in the period around the forming of the postwar 
amendments. Brandeis's attempted reorientation of the judicial 
process around facts, away from abstract reasoning and abstract 
principle, begs for a deeper kind of analysis than any of our au-
thors gives it. Facts do not speak for themselves as clearly as 
Brandeis may have supposed. Strum begins to raise these ques-
tions when she wonders, in the light of our changed views about 
women, whether Brandeis's approach in Muller was correct or val-
uable. But she too is a biographer, and biography may not be the 
best medium for consideration of such questions. 
II 
The biographers diverge far more sharply in their depictions 
of the events surrounding Brandeis's nomination to the Court 
than in their accounts of his role in Muller. At one end is Mason, 
who devotes two fairly lengthy chapters to the subject, supplying a 
thorough survey of the forces on each side and a detailed sum-
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mary of the arguments made against Brandeis in the hearings. On 
the other is Strum, who devotes less than ten of her four hundred 
pages to this subject. Paper's account of the confirmation covers 
about the same amount of space and follows the same chronologi-
cal organization as Mason's. But Paper's treatment is superior. 
He has more information than Mason did, including a fuller and 
more plausible reconstruction of Wilson's motives in nominating 
Brandeis and of the events leading to Brandeis's success in the 
Senate Judiciary Committee. Paper's account of the various is-
sues raised in the hearings is also much clearer than Mason's. An 
official biographer is partly an archivist, and Mason seems as 
much concerned to pack in all the information he can as to make 
good narrative or analytic sense of the story he undertakes to tell. 
The later biographers labor under much less obligation to get it all 
in, and show more concern for making sense of the evidence. 
Mason was ambivalent about the cause and meaning of the 
furor over Brandeis's nomination. In his most thematic statement, 
he interprets the uproar as follows: "In effect privilege, openly 
and for the first time, proclaimed: 'Hands off! The Supreme 
Court is our province.' " On the other hand, a rather similar at-
tempt by Brandeis himself to dismiss all the opposition "as tools 
or adjuncts of sinister forces" was pronounced by Mason to be 
"not very successful"; nor, says he, ''was it wholly admirable." 
Paper gets a more solid thematic hold on the confirmation fuss by 
observing that "the main issue" was "Brandeis's character." The 
dredging through the records of Brandeis's past behavior was not 
so much for the sake of finding Brandeis guilty of illegal behavior 
as to see how it reflected on "Brandeis's ethics, on his tempera-
ment, on his ability to be a fair and honest judge." 
In the perception that the issue was Brandeis's character and 
in the realization that that topic is an important opportunity for a 
biographer, Baker does far better than Strum. While it would be a 
great exaggeration to say that Baker makes full use of the oppor-
tunity, he does see that the microscopic public probing of his sub-
ject is a proper matter for his biography. And, like Mason, even 
though he hesitates to endorse any of the arguments raised against 
Brandeis (they were "baseless charges"), he nonetheless supplies 
enough information for the reader to see at least some of the point 
of the opposition-that it was not merely the knee-jerk reaction of 
men trying to preserve their well-manicured lawns. There were 
g~nuine questions about that elusive, but real quality called judi-
cial temperament. As one of Brandeis's opponents put it: 
I consider the nomination unfit to be made not because Mr. Brandeis is a bad 
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man, but because he is not a judicial man. Nobody in Boston would think of 
selecting him as a referee about anything. That is the test. He has brooded over 
such subjects as rights of labor until he has reached a point where it is impossible 
for him to be fair.9 
As all the biographers emphasize, Brandeis was a partisan, a man 
who adopted causes and fought very hard for them. His friend 
Holmes mused about it: "I'm not sure that he wouldn't bum me 
at a low fire if it were in the interest of some very possibly disinter-
ested aim." Baker calls this assertion "one of the better estimates" 
of Brandeis. 
Strum's treatment of the hearings is worse than Baker's. In a 
book that tops four hundred pages of text, she declines to follow 
the hearings in any detail, because all this makes "a lengthy and 
dramatic tale, which has been told elsewhere." But much else in 
her book also has been told elsewhere. This reviewer suspects that 
Strum decides not to go over the charges about Brandeis not only 
because they do raise questions about the propriety of some of his 
actions and of some of his attitudes, but even more because they 
bring the very question of his character to the fore. That is a ques-
tion she seems reluctant to treat. As she says in her preface, "be-
cause information on Brandeis the man is sparse, his personal life 
will remain something of a mystery." It is not merely that she 
supplies us with very little in the way of a portrait of Brandeis at 
home and play, nothing of his intimate life and not much of his 
family life, but that she shies away from probing into Brandeis the 
person, and therefore misses out on the central possibility opened 
up by biography as a genre. She gives us an encyclopedic account 
of a career, but the personality behind that career is missing. 
III 
The absence of more sustained and more daring psychologi-
cal speculation is a defect in the whole group of Brandeis biogra-
phies. I do not mean to suggest that biographers ought to become 
clinical psychologists, or choose sides in the debates between dif-
ferent schools of psychology, but that more attention to psycho-
logical matters is part of the obligation of the biographer to find 
the thread, the organizing principle inside the life they are study-
ing.w Biography is most often practiced in a way that implies 
authors consider it a "safe" genre. Hard work in the sources, a 
9. A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 470 (quoting Josiah H. Benton). 
10. SeeM. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION (1970), and P. 
SHAW, THE CHARACTER OF JoHN ADAMS (1976) as examples of books in which, in quite 
different ways, the authors make a sustained and intelligent but altogether nondogmatic 
elfon to reconstruct the psychology of their subjects. 
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certain facility in organizing materials, an ability to write passable 
narrative, an eye for the human-interest anecdote-these and sim-
ilar qualities are what biographers typically bring to their work. 
The course of the subject's life normally saves the biographer 
from making the kind of fundamental choices about theme and 
structure that authors in other genres must make. Mere accuracy 
and comprehensiveness as such become, more often than not, the 
aims of the tale. When these are lacking we readily appreciate 
their value. Yet they are not enough. 
So far as biography has a unique contribution to make, it is 
through the possibility it offers of placing human deeds and 
thoughts into the context of a whole life, a life understood not 
merely as an aggregation of events and deeds, but as the working 
out of a unified or unity-seeking personality. Thinkers as different 
from Freud as Plato and Aristotle would agree, I think, that re-
construction of the soul, and of the way that soul informs the 
deeds and thoughts of the subject is the most valuable contribu-
tion biography may make. Lest I be misunderstood, however, let 
me quickly add that I do not believe that psychological recon-
struction can substitute for historical, political, and other kinds of 
knowledge. Nor do I wish to equate psychological insight with 
Freudian dogmatizing. The most successful biographies tend to 
employ relatively commonsensical psychological categories.'' 
Over-reliance on psychological theory is just another safe type of 
biographical writing. Properly done, biography, far from being 
one of the safer genres, is perhaps the riskiest. The subject is a 
soul, a person, a self, a character, however one wishes to name it, 
acting and thinking in a given historical world. Both the personal-
ity and its world are elusive, sprawling, hidden in their own ways. 
Biographers must therefore be the most daring of authors. They 
must behave less like archivists and more like novelists. Or even 
more difficult, they must blend the artistry of the novelist with the 
solid virtues of the archivist. 
Strum may have failed most spectacularly in her zealous 
avoidance of the person of Justice Brandeis, but even so her book 
is the best of the lot and indeed quite good by any standard. 
While it falls short of what biography at its best might be, it 
avoids what biography at its most common is. 
Most of the time, Baker writes nicely, better on the whole 
than Strum, whose prose has a much heavier, more academic pall 
about it. While his book is certainly well researched, the fact that 
II. Cf. R. GilliNGS, THE NATURE OF BIOGRAPHY 43 (1978); R. ELLMAN, GOLDEN 
CoDGERS 1-17 (1973); Nadel, supra note 6, at 113-20. 
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he is writing a "dual biography" of Brandeis and Frankfurter re-
quires that he take a less microscopic approach to the materials of 
their lives. Approaching the materials at a more general level, he 
frequently is more insightful and revealing than the other authors. 
For instance, his description of Brandeis's Zionist activities con-
tains much less detail than Strum's account of the same matters, 
but he does a better job of placing those activities in the context of 
Zionism and of the world forces shaping and constraining the Zi-
onist movement. Likewise, he is often fuller than Strum on Bran-
deis's judicial career; he gives a better account of the emergence of 
the clear and present danger test, for example, than she does. 
But for all his strengths, Baker still produces a book that gets 
nowhere in particular. The work probably closest to it in inten-
tion is Murphy's The Brandeis/ Frankfurter Connection; like Mur-
phy, Baker seems to have been inspired to address the careers of 
the two men because of the recent coming to light of documents 
bearing on their long-standing and multifarious relationship. But 
Murphy did not write a biography. He wrote a contentiously the-
matic book, addressing an issue about the relationship between 
judges and politics. Baker's book, in contrast, is governed by little 
other than a sense that there is something "interesting" in the lives 
of his two subjects. In this reader's opinion, at least, that wasn't 
enough to make his book itself consistently interesting. 
Strum's book succeeds because it has point and direction. 
Her real interest is not in the life of Brandeis, but in Brandeis as 
the bearer and champion of an alternative form of liberalism to 
that which triumphed in the New Deal and which writhes in crisis 
in the 1970's and 1980's. Her book may not be great biography, 
but it is a fine study of political thought. She sees Brandeis partly 
as an architect of twentieth-century liberalism, but more impor-
tantly as a spokesman for the "road not taken." Brandeis devel-
oped what I would call a "noble liberalism," liberal in being 
inspired by generosity of spirit and concern for justice, noble in its 
insistence that the end was the development of free and strong 
human beings. Modern liberalism has made peace with depen-
dence; Brandeis never forgot that the goal was independence. 
Modern liberalism has accepted the legitimacy of governance by 
elites, including courts; Brandeis sought to establish the conditions 
for democratic rule within or against all institutions, including 
courts. 
Readers of this journal will be interested to know that Strum 
devotes most of her attention to Brandeis's pre-Court career as a 
reformer, and especially to the deepening development of his lib-
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eral vision. She covers the Court years briefly and almost casu-
ally; her treatment of his years on the Supreme Court is governed 
by a thought that she attributes to Brandeis, but that more clearly 
represents her own view of the judicial part of his career: 
"[C]learly he considered a Court seat appropriate for his 'retire-
ment' years." Nonetheless Strum, more than Baker and the other 
biographers, opens herself to learning from Brandeis, and thus she 
has something more to teach as well. 
